Interpretación y construcción jurídica

Authors

  • Riccardo Guastini Università di Genova, Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, Istituto Tarello per la Filosofia del diritto

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5347/43.2015.71

Keywords:

interpretation, legal indeterminacy, legal construction, interpretive arguments, legal rules on interpretation

Abstract

Legal Interpretation and Legal Construction

This article spells out an analytical and realistic theory of legal interpretation. Analytical, since its method is the logical analysis of jurists’ and judges’ language. Realistic, since it assumes, first, that law is indeterminate and, second, that judicial interpretation is intrinsically discretionary. In the first part, some fundamental distinctions are introduced, namely: “in abstracto” and “in concreto” interpretation; cognitive, adjudicative, and creative interpretation; interpretation strictly understood and juristic construction. The last mentioned distinction, in particular, takes on a special importance. Interpretation properly understood amounts to ascribing meaning to normative texts, whereas juristic construction mainly consists in formulating new norms, supposedly implicit in the legal system. The second part is devoted to the logical analysis of the arguments most commonly used by jurists to justify their interpretive and constructive operations.

Published

2015-10-31

How to Cite

Guastini, R. (2015). Interpretación y construcción jurídica. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (43), 11–48. https://doi.org/10.5347/43.2015.71

Issue

Section

Research Articles