Conceptual Norms: Contrasting Theories

Authors

  • David Duarte University of Lisbon

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.58/2023.481

Keywords:

conceptual norms, prescriptiveness, mental actions, normative systems, explanatory power of theories

Abstract

Mainstream accounts of conceptual norms depict them as a specific kind of (sub)norms in as much as they establish a certain equivalence without making reference to an action-type, which implies also that they lack a deontic modalization. However, such non-prescriptive explanation raises some serious problems, mainly when it is assumed that the introduction of a conceptual norm into a normative system changes the content of the system. Those problems pave the way to contrast such explanation with a prescriptive alternative according to which conceptual norms are regulative in character, though with the peculiarity of addressing the mental action of qualifying something in accordance with a given equivalence. All-things-considered, from such contrast it seems to follow that the prescriptive explanation is less problematic than the non-prescriptive one.

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Published

2023-06-10

How to Cite

Duarte, D. (2023). Conceptual Norms: Contrasting Theories. Isonomía - Revista De teoría Y filosofía Del Derecho, (58). https://doi.org/10.5347/isonomia.58/2023.481

Issue

Section

Research Articles